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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
IUCIIARD D. GILL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vsJOHN \V. TURNER, \VARDEN,
UTAH STATE PRISON,
corporation,
Defcndant-Respondent.

Case No.
12892

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEl\lENT QI;-. THE NATURE
0 F THE CASE
The appellant, Richard D. Gill, appeals from a decision of the Third Judicial District Court denying his
release from the Utah State Prison upon a Petition for
a '\Trit of Habeas Corpus.
DISPOSITION IN TI-IE LOVVER COURT
Richard D. Gill filed a Complaint and Petition
seeking a \V rit of Habeas Corpus alleging that his commitment to the Utah State Prison was invalid. The matter came on for hearing on April 4, 1972 before Judge
.Joseph G. Jeppson, who denied the petition on April
14, 1972.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant, Richard D. Gill, seeks reversal of
the court be low with the direction that he be released
from the custody of the Respondent upon a Writ of
IIabeas Corpus.
S'fATEl\IENT 01•" FACTS
AppelJant was arrested on a charge of robbery and
has been incarcerated and impecunious since the time of
his arrest. The counsel which was appointed originally
to represent appellant on this charge withdrew about
three weeks after appellant was first b1:ought before a
magistrate. This withdrawal was apparently based on a
conflict of interest. ( R. 38, 61) .l\Ir. Golden Robbins
was subsequently appointed to represent appellant.
Appellant testified tha-t his first contact with l\Ir.
Robbins was on December 26, 1967, the date he entered
his plea of guilty before Judge Faux of the Third Judicial District. (R. 37) AppelJant was sentenced on that
date to be committed to the Utah State Prison for the
indeterminate term as provided by law. ( R. 46; Exhibit
1, p. 4)
The transcript of the entry of the plea indicates
that l\Ir. Gill was not informed of the full consequences
of his plea. The court at no time prior to accepting Mr.
Gill's plea of
told him of the possible sentence
he faced by pleading guilty. (Exhibit I, p. 3)
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At the habeas corpus hearing, :l\Ir. Gill testified
that he hacl pleaded guilty to robbery without knowing
that he would be sentenced for an indeterminate term
of fi\'e years to life. (It. 38) He further testified that
he was a citizen of :Missouri, and had received a
determinate sentence for a felony conviction there. he
assumed Utah also imposed determinate sentences. (R.
39) l\Ir. Gill also testified that his attorney at no time
indicated that he faced an indeterminate sentence;
rather, he was led to believe that he would serve only a
couple of years in prison. ( R. 36)

ARGUl\IENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING
THAT APPELLANT 'VAS REPRESENTED
BY EFF'ECTIVE COUNSEL.
Appellant contends that the failure of the court to
appoint effective counsel renders his plea invalid.
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55,
77 L.Rcl. 158 ( 1932), Justice Sutherland suggested
that failure to make effective appointment of counsel
would constitute denial of due process of law. The court
noted that the rluty to assign counsel is not discharged by
an assignment at such time or under such circumstances
as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the prep-
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a ration and trial of the case. (at p. 71)
In Alires<'. Turner. 22 Utah2<l 118, 449 P.2cl 241
( 1 !){)!)), the court recognized that the right to have
counsel is inclu<led in the concept of clue process of law.
It further stated that this requirement is not satisfiell
by a sham or pretense of an appearance in the record by
an attorney who manifests no real concern about the
interests of the accused. The court felt that the entitlement is to assistance of a competent member of the Bar,
who shows a willingness to identify himself with the interests of the defendant and present such defenses as
are available to him under the law and consistent with
the ethics of the profession. (at p. 243)

An examination of the record reveals that the appointment of counsel for l\lr.
"as a mere gesture
and did not comply with the constitutional mandate of
the Fourteenth Amendment. l\lr. Gill testified that his
first and only contact with l\Ir. Robbins was the same
day he entered his guilty plea; that their conversation
lasted only fifteen minutes, <luring which time they did
not discuss the e\'ents leading to the charge, any possible
defenses, nor the possible sentence l\lr. Gill faced by
pleading guilty. (U. 38) By his own testimony l\Ir.
Hobbins admitted his reluctance to represent l\fr. Gill
( R. 48, 49) ) , his inexperience in criminal work ( R. 48),
and his uncertainty of the sentence for robbery. (R. 53)
Appellant contends that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Consti-
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tution because he was entitled to rely upon his counsel
to make an independent examination of the facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws i1wolved and then to offer his informed opinion as to what plea should be entered. Appellant further contends that since .Mr. Robbins failed to do any of the above, appellant was deprived of effective counsel. ( R. 38)
Appellant further contends that since his appointed counsel was so inexperienced and failed to make any
preparation of his case, he was virtually unrepresented
hy counsel, and, as in cases where the defendant is not
represented by counsel, the court had a duty under §
77-24-6, Utah Code Annotated ( 1953), to explain to
him the consequences of his guilty plea before accepting it. Since the sentence is definitely a consequence of
a guilty plea, the judge failed to comply with § 7724-6.

Because Appellant was not represented by effective counsel, and because the court failed to advise him
of the consequences of his guilty plea, Appellant contends that his plea is invalid, that his confinement is
illegal and void, and that he must be granted a Writ of
Habeas Corpus.

POINT II
THE COURT BELO'V ERRED IN FINDING
THAT APPELLANT ENTERED HIS GUILTY PLEA VOLUNTARILY.

G

Appellant contends that his guilty plea was not
voluntary because he was not told the full consequences
of his guilty plea and he was coerced into pleading
guilty.
The standard as to the voluntariness of guilty pleas,
according to the court in JJrad.IJ v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed. 737 (1970) at p.
755, is essentially that defined by Judge Tuttle of the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Shelton v. United
State, 246 F.2d 571 (1957), at p. 115:

A plea of guilty entered by one fully
aware of the direct consequences, including the
actual value of any commitments ma<le to him
by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel,
must stand unless induced by threats (or
promises to cliscont_inue improper harassment),
misrepresentation ...
Appellant contends that he was not fully aware of
the direct consequences of his guilty plea because the
judge did not a(hise him as to the sentence for pleading
to robbery, nor did his attorney advise him as to
the indeterminancy of the sentence. ( R. 38, 39) Since
appellant was a citizen of l\Iissouri, and his only contact
with the law had been in l\Iissouri where he had served
a determinate term for conviction of a felony, he
pleaded guilty on the assumption that Utah also imposed
determinate sentences. ( R. 39) Because the determinan-
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er or

indetcrminancy of the sentence is a direct conse<inence of a guilty plea, and because appellant was not
aware of this consequence, his plea could not have been
entered voluntarily.
Evidence of coercion is found in appellant's testimony that he was kept in isolation pending his plea and
threatened with additional charges if he failed to plead
guilty ( R. 35, 42) ; that he was told his girlfriend, a
co-clefendant, would not he placed on probation unless
he pleaded ,guilty (R. 35, 4-0). Additionally, :Mr. Gill
was told that his brother, who was also being held, had
attempted suicide and would be harassed into it, if l\ir.
Gill did not plead guilty. (R. 35, 36, 40)
Because the starnlanl as to the voluntariness of a
guilty plea as defined in Shelton was not met, and be-

cause appellant cli<l not voluntarily plead guilty to a
charge which imposes an indeterminate sentence of five
years to life, appellant contends that his confinement is
illegal and void, and that he must be granted a Writ of
Ha he as Corpus.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, that appellant was
not represented by effective counsel, and that appellant's guilty plea was not voluntarily entered, appellant
respectfully submits that the judgment of the court
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below be reversed and that he be granted the "\Vrit of
Jiabeas Corpus.
Respectfully submitted,

DAVID P. RHODE
Attorney for Appellant

